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Re´sume´ / Abstract
The ICMS-Ecolo´gico is a fiscal transfer mechanism from states to municipalities,
implemented in the early 1990’s in Brazil, to reward municipalities for the cre-
ation and management of protected areas. This paper investigates the efficiency
of this mechanism by testing for the presence of interactions among Brazilian mu-
nicipalities in their decision to create conservation units, in the state of Parana´,
between 2000 and 2010. We estimate a Bayesian spatial Tobit model in order
to analyze the behavior of municipalities. The empirical investigation reveals
strategic substitutability in municipalities conservation decisions.
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1. Introduction
Development policies implemented in Brazil from the late 60’s to the mid 80’s were
considered as “very aggressive and with little regard to the environmental consequences”
(Andersen et al., 2002, p.34). However, the growing interest by the international com-
munity in environmental problems and the worsening of the economic situation in Brazil
led to a change in policy making in the late 80’s. Indeed, several programs sprang up
with the purpose of promoting sustainable development (see for example Di Bitetti et al.
(2003) on biodiversity management and Feres and da Motta (2004) on water management).
This consideration of environmental issues in development policies was of the utmost im-
portance since Brazil is recognized as one of the planet’s major reserves of forests and
biodiversity. Myers et al. (2000) point out that Brazil is estimated as hosting one-sixth of
the endemic plant species of the earth’s, to cite but just one example.
Even if a political will at the federal level is important to protect the environment,
the state of the biodiversity is mainly influenced by local activities. One solution to pro-
tect flora and fauna at the local level, is the establishment of protected areas. However,
protected areas involve local conservation costs, in terms of land use restrictions, while
generating both local and global conservation benefits. These positive externalities are not
taken into account by the local entities, which leads to an under-provision of the environ-
mental public good (Perrings and Gadgil, 2003; Ring, 2008b; Barton et al., 2009, among
others)1. As explained by Farley et al. (2010), five mechanisms are widely recognized
for internalizing externalities and ensuring the provision of local public goods: prescrip-
tion, penalties, persuasion, property rights and payments. The main idea is to provide
incentives for local actors to engage in conservation efforts for promoting sustainable land
use.
Among mechanisms developed to promote sustainable development and urge local
actors to produce local public good, the ICMS-Ecolo´gico or ICMS-E (”Imposto sobre
Circulaca˜o de Mercadorias e Servicos - ecolo´gico” or ”Ecological value added tax”), which
1There are few incentives for local actors to encourage local conservation activities when environmental
benefits cross local boundaries.
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lies in the class of payments for environmental services, is of particular interest. The ICMS-
E is a fiscal transfer mechanism implemented in order to promote land conservation at
the local level. It is not only designed for Amazonian states2 but also aims at protecting
the Atlantic forests which are identified as a Biodiversity Hotspot and are threatened by
fragmentation, mainly due to agricultural expansion (see Brooks and Balmford (1996),
Brooks et al. (1999) or Putz et al. (2011) for example).
The ICMS-E is an intergovernmental ecological fiscal transfer from state to munici-
palities, used today in about half of the Brazilian states. It rewards municipalities for the
creation of protected areas (namely conservation units or CUs) and watershed reserves.
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are thus used to aid in internalizing the problem from
the cost side by compensating municipalities for foregone opportunities, i.e., potential rev-
enues lost due to conservation measures (Kumar and Managi, 2009). Indeed, one reason
for its implementation was the demand by municipalities hosting federal or state managed
protected areas to be compensated for the cost of providing this public good. Yet it was
also designed to incite municipalities to create new protected areas.
Since its implementation in the early 90’s, the ICMS-E has been a real success in terms
of CU creation. By 2000, the areas under protection had already increased by 62.4% in
the State of Minas Gerais and by 165% in the State of Parana´ (May et al., 2002). In
addition, the mechanism has several interesting features. It is a decentralized system,
which implies that decision-makers benefit from better information. The mechanism is
implemented without any external financing (the redistributed funds are collected from
tax on goods and services in the concerned state).Finally, the transaction costs are very
low3. As such, it has been claimed that the ICMS-E could be an alternative to other
instruments such as pollution permits or pigovian taxes, notably for the implementation
of commitments in international environmental agreements (see Farley et al. (2010)).
Despite its attractiveness, very few studies have been carried out on the ICMS-E.
2Such as Avanca Brasil, for example (Andersen et al., 2002).
3According to Vogel (1997), in 1995, in the state of Parana´, 30,000,000 dollars were redistributed to
the municipalities for an administrative cost of only $32,000.
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Grieg-Gran (2000) analyzes which municipalities have benefited from the ICMS-E reform
and finds mixed evidence. She points out that until 2000, only 60% of the municipalities
of Rondonia and Minas Gerais with protected areas benefited from the introduction of
the ICMS-Ecologico. Furthermore, May et al. (2002) provide some interesting state level
statistics for the Parana´ and Minas Gerais states, as well as several inspiring case studies4.
Finally, Ring (2008a) highlights the appeal of the ICMS-E by providing a clear description
of the mechanism, along with trends and macro level statistics on the creation of CUs in
the three states mentioned above.
However, although these three studies are informative and highlight the strengths of
the ICMS-E, no one has questioned the mechanism’s efficiency. Yet, the ICMS-E is a
decentralized policy, and as stated by Oates and Portney (2003), the decentralization of
a policy could lead to an inefficient outcome if a race to the bottom between agents in
the creation of local public good is observed. However, as we will see in our theoretical
section, there are several reasons for expecting municipalities to influence each other when
deciding whether or not to create CUs. More precisely, the interactions between counties
can evolve in two directions: their decisions can be substitutes or complements, and the
presence of complementarities between decisions can indicate the presence of a race to the
bottom5.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to test one condition for the efficiency of the
mechanism, by investigating the presence of interactions between counties when they
decide whether or not to protect their lands. We collected data on the ICMS-E for 399
municipalities of the state of Parana´ between 2000 to 2010. This state constitutes a case
of primary interest because it was the first to adopt the mechanism in question in 1991
and was a pioneer in introducing a quality-weighting factor for the redistribution of the
ICMS-E6.
4Several mayors were interviewed and asked why they had used the ICMS-E mechanism.
5The terms “county” and “municipality” will be used interchangeably thoughout the rest of the paper.
6The transparency of the system is also an interesting feature in this state, since all information
concerning the nature of the park, its area and the amount of money received from the ICMS-E by a
municipality can be downloaded from the internet.
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The contributions of this paper are diverse. We build a new database thanks to the
reports released by the IAP (Instituto Ambiental do Parana´). We discuss the possible
interactions between municipalities and assess them through the Bayesian spatial Tobit
estimator proposed by LeSage (1999, 2000) and LeSage and Pace (2009). This estimator
allows us to test the presence of interactions among municipalities in their conservation
decisions. Negative spatial interactions among municipalities are found, suggesting that
conservation decisions are strategic substitutes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the context in which the ICMS-
E was implemented in the Brazilian state of Parana´. Section 3 presents the theoretical
hypothesis explaining the nature of interactions between municipalities in providing con-
servation units. Section 4 details the estimation strategy, while results are analyzed in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes with the possible policy implications.
2. ICMS-E and conservation units in Parana´
2.1. Presentation of the ICMS-E
Brazil is federation with 27 states which capture most of their revenue from taxes
on the circulation of goods and services, i.e., a value-added tax (VAT), called the ICMS
(Imposto sobre Circulaca˜o de Mercadorias e Servicos). States must return 25% of collected
revenue from sales taxes to municipalities according to certain criteria. Three quarters of
this redistribution is defined by the federal constitution (the main criterion is the added
value created by each municipality), but Article 158 of the Federal Constitution states
that the remaining 25% (i.e., 6.75% of the total) is allocated according to each state’s
legislation (for instance based on population size or health expenditures).
In 1992, the state of Parana´ (see the geographical map 1, page 27, on Brazilian states)
was the first to introduce ecological criteria in the redistribution of the ICMS-E. The state
rewards municipalities for having protected areas (biodiversity) and watershed reserves
(water quality) within their boundaries7. The initiative was followed by several states8
7See May et al. (2002, P.175) for a more complete presentation of the legislative process in Parana´.
814 other Brazilian states have already introduced the ICMS-E, including Sa˜o Paulo (1996), Minas
7
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and this new fiscal incentive tool is now called ICMS-Ecolo´gico.
In Parana´, the law stipulates that 5% of the ICMS revenues redistributed to munici-
palities should be in proportion to their environmental performance. Half of this (2.5%) is
used to reward municipalities for the creation of conservation areas (also called “conserva-
tion units” (CUs)). These CUs can be publicly managed (federal, state or municipal level),
privately owned or managed by public-private partnerships (such as reserva particular do
patrimoˆnio natural, RPPN). It is worth noting that municipalities have no obligation to
create and improve protected areas, but are simply rewarded depending on the extent to
which they meet the criteria in comparison with other municipalities. in addition, since
only a fixed pool of money is available in any given year, the municipalities compete with
each other to receive the money. The other half (2.5%) of the pool of money redistributed
according to environmental criteria, is for those municipalities that have watershed protec-
tion areas which partly or completely provide services for public drinking water systems
in neighboring municipalities9. The main motivation of this fiscal redistribution policy
was initially to compensate municipalities for the opportunity costs of conservation areas
(often decided at the central level, i.e., the state) and for protecting watersheds. But this
policy created significant incentives for the creation of new protected areas which, in turn,
allowed for an increase in the number and area of both state and municipal protected
areas.
2.2. The Municipal Conservation Factor
A stated before, the state of Parana´ was the first to use environmental criteria to
redistribute the ICMS. It was also a pioneer in taking into account the quality of protected
areas (Farley et al., 2010; May et al., 2002). The state redistributes the ICMS according
Gerais (1996), Rondonia (1996), Amapa´ (1996), Rio Grande do Sul (1998), Mato Grosso (2001), Mato
Grosso do Sul (2001), Pernambuco (2001), Tocantins (2002) (see the official website of the ICMS-E,
http://www.icmsecologico.org.br/, and Ver´ıssimo et al. (2002); Ring (2008a)).
9See, for instance, the case of the municipality of Piraquara which has 10% of its territory covered
by protected areas for biodiversity conservation and the remaining 90% used for conserving a major
watershed to supply the Curitiba metropolitan region (1.5 million inhabitants) with drinking water (May
et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a).
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to the relative Municipal Conservation Factor (MCF) of a municipality compared to the
sum of overall MCF in the State. The MCF is derived from the ratio of CUs to total
municipal area weighted by a quality factor.
The MCF has thus two components: a quantitative and a qualitative one. The former
is the percentage of municipal land area under protection in the total area of the county.
The latter evaluates the quality of the conservation unit on the basis of variables, such
as biological and physical quality, the quality of water resources in and around the CUs,
how important is the CU in the regional ecosystem, the quality of planning, implemen-
tation, maintenance and the legitimacy of the unit in the community10. These factors
also reflect the improvements of CUs over time as well as their relationships with the
surrounding areas11. The quality of each CU is assessed by regional officers of the Envi-
ronmental Institute of Parana´ (Instituto Ambiental do Parana´, IAP). Their evaluation is
then transformed in a score weighting the quantitative ratio12.
The Ecological Index of the municipality i is calculated as follows (this part is adapted
from Loureiro et al. (2008, p.22-23) and Ring (2008a)).
First is the calculation of the Biodiversity Conservation Coefficient (BCCji) of each
CU j in the municipality i as follows:
BCCij =
(
Area CUj
Area municipalityi
)
∗ FCn, (1)
where Area CUj and Area municipalityi are the area of the conservation unit j and the
area of the municipality i respectively. Each BCCij is multiplied by a conservation factor
FCn which is variable and assigned to protected areas according to management category
n (see Table 1 page 28 in the Appendix for more information on the weighting factor of
10See Farley et al. (2010).
11For instance, the quality factor of a CU will increase if the county creates buffer zones around this
area.
12According to May et al. (2002), the quality index is also assessed regarding to “exceeding compliance
with extant agreements with municipalities; development of facilities; supplementary analysis of municipal
actions regarding housing and urban planning, agriculture, health, and sanitation; support to producers
and local communities; and the number and amount of environmental penalties applied, within the
municipality, by public authorities”.
9
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each protected area).
Next each BCCij is assigned an ESC criterion to account for the variation of the
“quality” of protected area as follows:
BCCQij = [BCCij + (BCCij ∗ ESC)], (2)
where ESC is the variation of the CU quality weighted by the management strategy and
the nature of the protected areas, i.e., municipal, state, federal.
The municipal conservation factor (MCFi) is based on the sum of each BCCQij in
the municipality i as follows:
MCFi =
J∑
j=1
BCCQij, (3)
where J is the number of CU in the municipality i13.
Finally, the biodiversity conservation coefficient or ecological index ECi of the munic-
ipality i is
EIi =
MCFi
SCF
, (4)
where the state conservation factor SCF is given by the sum of all municipal conservation
factors (MCF) in the state:
SCF =
Z∑
i=1
MCFi, (5)
where Z is the number of municipalities in the state receiving funds from the ICMS-E.
As explained earlier, a protected area can be managed at the federal, state or municipal
level. In this paper, we focus only on the creation of parks managed at the municipal
level, since it is only at this level that the municipality has full power over the creation or
destruction of parks. We are, therefore, primarily interested in the BCC and MCF index
for municipal parks.
13For instance, Curitiba had 15 conservation units in 2000.
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2.3. Evolution of conservation units in Parana´
A brief overview of the evolution of the number of counties in the ICMS-E for all CUs
between 2000 and 2010 is given by Figure 2 in the Appendix (page 29). There were 174
counties in the ICMS-E (i.e., receiving funds for the presence of CUs in their territory)
in 2000, compared to 192 in 2010, . The number of counties in the fiscal mechanism has
thus increased by 22 in 11 years, while 4 counties have decided to leave the mechanism
(i.e., convert their parks for economic uses).
As stated before, in our analysis, we focus only on the creation of parks managed
at the municipal level. Therefore, as shown by figure 3 (see Appendix, page 29), the
number of counties which have received funds for the creation of municipal parks has
increased by 9 counties between 2000 and 2010 (57 in 2000 compared to 66 in 2010) over
the 399 counties in the dataset. As a consequence, 342 and 333 counties did not receive
fiscal transfers from the ICMS-E for the creation of municipal CUs in 2000 and 2010
repsectively. Moreover, it is worth noting that 4 counties have converted their municipal
CUs for economic purposes during the last decade, and no longer receive funds from the
ICMS-E, while 13 new counties have received fund from the ICMS-E for the creation of
their first municipal CUs.
Further, as we can see in Table 3, the average size of the area of municipal parks
by county is about 1,172 hectares in 2010, representing on average 2 percent of the mu-
nicipality’s area. By comparison, federal and state managed parks covered about 10,030
hectares in average by county (11 percent of the total municipal area).
[insert table 3 here]
Finally, the Figure 4 (see Appendix, page 31) shows the evolution of the area of all CUs
by hectare at the state level14. The evolution of CUs can be divided into two decades. In
the first decade, the creation of CUs increased sharply, while in the second decade (from
14Of course, these figures concern all CUs, i.e., federal, state and municipal CUs whereas only the
evolution of municipal CUs created is of interest in our study. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable
data on the creation of municipal CU’s prior to 2000.
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2000), the creation of CUs increased more reasonably. Thus it can be assumed that the
creation of CUs in the state of Parana´ through the ICMS-E mechanism has reached a
kind of stationary level.
3. Analytical framework
3.1. Why test for the presence of interactions between conservation decisions?
As pointed out by Barton et al. (2009), ecological fiscal transfers such as the ICMS-
Ecologico “provide an interesting and rather new case for comparative analysis on the
effectiveness and efficiency of biodiversity conservation instrument.” Therefore, and as
explained in the introduction, the aim of this work is to contribute to this area of research,
by testing one condition for the efficiency (defined in terms of parks creation) of the ICMS-
E15.
The ICMS-E is a decentralized fiscal transfer mechanism from states to municipalities.
Yet, as stated by Oates (see for instance Oates and Portney (2003)), one condition for
efficient decentralization is the absence of interactions between agents. With respect to the
ICMS-E, this point was first underlined by Ring (2008a), who wrote: “Despite the general
suitability of many land-use issues for being assigned to lower governmental levels, spatial
externalities may require different, more appropriate solutions.” Indeed, the mechanism
would be inefficient, if for example, a race to the bottom in park-creation decisions were
observed, leading to a low overall level of area under protection in the state. Testing the
nature of (horizontal) interaction between municipalities’ decisions is therefore crucial to
assess the efficiency of the mechanism16.
15Indeed, we define efficiency here in relation to the main goal of the mechanism, which is the creation
of protected areas in order to preserve biodiversity. Other definitions of efficiency could be measured in
terms of avoided deforestation in the overall state, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
16See Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) for another example of testing for the presence of horizontal
interactions in the case of environmental criteria.
12
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3.2. What is the likely nature of these interactions?
In reality, the interactions between a county and its neighbors can evolve in two direc-
tions. On the one hand, the level of parks in a county and one of its neighbors could be
strategic complements, meaning that the utility of a county’s creation of parks increases
with the creation of parks by its peers. On the other hand, the level of parks in a county
and one of its neighbors could be strategic substitutes, meaning that the utility of a
county’s creation of parks decreases with the creation of parks by its peers. Indeed, there
exist arguments for both possibilities, and we will expose these arguments in the following
paragraphs. To develop and present our arguments, we consider, that with a given plot, a
municipality can choose between two options: designating an area as protected or unpro-
tected. A protected area means the creation of a municipal park whereas an unprotected
area refers to the development of economic activities (industry, agriculture, logging,...).
A strategic complementarity in municipalities’ conservation decisions would mean that
a county has an interest in following the decisions of its neighbor. For instance, the utility
gained from the creation of a park increases (decreases) if the neighbor is creating more
(less) protected areas. This could be motivated by three main factors. First, according
to the Tiebout theory of “voting with the feet” (Tiebout, 1956), a new firm could choose
the municipality where the environmental standards are lower to establish itself. This
could lead to a race to the bottom between municipalities if ever they want to attract
the firm. Second, a farmer could choose the county where its potential development is
the higher (i.e., where there are less protected areas). Therefore, this could lead the
municipalities to compete again based on this criterion. Finally, as pointed by Andam
(2007), the establishment of protected areas in a county can lessen the development of
local market infrastructure, such as transport. It could then reduce the profitability of
economic activities in neighboring counties, which do not enjoy these infrastructures. The
spillovers from the creation of a park in one municipality can thus be positive and induce
the creation of a park in the neighboring municipality17.
17Or the other way around, the development of infrastructures can exacerbate deforestation (see for
example Pfaff (1999)).
13
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However, if we think in terms of the profitability of the two options, development of
economic activities or creation of parks, we could also expect the decisions to be strategic
substitutes. This could come through four channels. First, the creation of a protected
area in one municipality could constrain economic activity and lead to a worker surplus in
this municipality. The displacement of the worker surplus to the neighboring municipality
could bring down the wage level and favor the decision to develop economic activities
over choosing the protection option. Second, the creation of new CUs decreases the
stock of lands available for economic production in a given municipality. Therefore, it
increases the demand of lands for economic production in the neighboring municipalities.
Depending on the relative profits from economic activities, the municipalities could be
incited to increase their supply of land for economic activities (by decreasing their number
of CUs), in order to attract farmers and firms when their neighbors are creating protected
areas. We could therefore, in this case again, expect protection decisions to be strategic
substitutes. Moreover, we could think of an effect traditionally highlighted in studies
on deforestation leakages. The creation of a park in a municipality will decrease the
availability of the wood resources in this municipality and then increase the logging in
the neighboring municipalities (a phenomenon also referred to as outsourcing by Aukland
et al. (2003)). The creation of parks in a municipality will therefore go along with the
destruction of protected areas or the reduction of incentives to create new ones in the
neighboring municipalities. Finally, a protected area is also a public good, that local
population can enjoy. Yet, the distance between two municipalities is relatively small,
and the citizens from one municipality could go to the neighboring municipality to enjoy
the recreation of a park. A municipality could then decide to “free ride” and create less
parks if the neighboring municipalities are providing this local public good.
Considering the arguments expounded above, we could expect conservation decisions
to be strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The following section 4 will deal with
the empirical strategy implemented in order to distinguidh between the two hypothesis.
14
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4. Empirical strategy
4.1. Econometric model and data used
As explained by Anselin (2001) the spatial lag model is appropriate when the focus of
interest is the assessment of the existence and strength of spatial interaction. This fitting
with our question of interest, we therefore estimate a Spatial AutoRegressive (SAR) model,
where the spatially lagged endogenous variable is a weighted sum of neighbors’ decisions,
such as:
P ∗ = ρWP ∗ + βX +  (6)
where P ∗ is a K × 1 vector of the propensity to create municipal CUs by a county.
K is the number of municipalities in the sample, here 399. X is a M ×K matrix of our
M explanatory variables influencing the choice between the protected and unprotected
options and β is a vector of their corresponding coefficients.  is a K×1 vector of residuals.
WP ∗ is a spatially lagged endogenous variable, where W is a K × N contiguity matrix
of which each element wjk takes the value of 1 if two counties share a common border,
0 otherwise (where j identifies a municipality different from municipality k). Hence, ρ
capture the presence of interactions between municipalities.
The dependent variable is latent, i.e., cannot be observed for p∗ < 0. Indeed, there is a
large number of zero observations in our sample. In 2010, 342 municipalities over 399 did
not create municipal CUs. Having 0% of municipal CUs is a corner solution, it does not
mean that each municipality is in exactly the same situation. We can therefore argue that
censoring is at stake and that there exist negative profits unmeasured by our dependent
variable exist. Therefore, we have:
pj = 0 if p
∗
j ≤ 0
pj = p
∗
j otherwise,
where pj is the observed dependent variable. Following the traditional approach in
land use studies initiated by Chomitz and Gray (1996), we account for this censoring
15
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using a tobit model, where the conditional distribution of pj given all other parameters is
a truncated normal distribution constructed by truncating distribution from the left at 0.
The expanded form of the spatial autoregressive tobit model is the following:
p∗j = ρ
K∑
j 6=k
wjkp
∗
k + βp
init
j + δFEDj + α1indj + α2agrj + α3incj
+ α4incsqj + α5popj + α6urbj + α7rurj + α8Curitibaj + µr + ϑj, (7)
where the observed dependent variable, pj, is the MCF of municipal parks of county
j in 2010 defined in Section 2.2 and pinitj represents the initial MCF in 2000. The MCF
in 2000 is introduced to account for the initial conditions determined by the first period
of implementation of the mechanism.
All other variables are control variables and are assumed to have an impact on the
land allocation decision-rule. First FEDj is introduced which is the MCF for other CUs
(federal and state managed) in the county i in 2010. This variable can have both negative
and positive expected effects. Given that the area of a county is by definition fixed,
more non-municipal CUs increase the scarcity of land. In this context, the effect of a land
allocation decision is ambiguous. First, the creation of federal or state level protected areas
could decrease the amount of land to be potentially converted into municipal conservation
areas. FEDj would therefore have a negative effect on pj. However, wa can assume that
land scarcity increases land price, discouraging investment in this county since the costs
for the unprotected option go up. knowing this, the municipality may decide to protect
the land and create CUs to earn more money from the ICMS-E18.
The variables indj and agrj respectively are the average ratio of the industrial GDP on
the total municipal GDP between 2000 and 2008, and the average ratio of the agricultural
GDP on the total municipal GDP between 2000 and 200819. These variables measure
the development projects and are assumed to increase the opportunity cost of creating
conservation units. They are thus negatively linked to the propensity to create municipal
parks.
18This can be seen as a kind of vertical interaction.
192008 is the last year for which data are available.
16
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The income (incj) is measured by the average of the GDP per capita between 2000
and 2008 (taken in logarithme). Moreover, the effect of the variable incj could be more
ambiguous since richer counties could be better off preserving their forests for ornamental
purposes. To test this idea, the quadratic term in log (incsqj) is used. Thus, (1) poorer
counties are assumed to be more inclined to create parks since their comparative advan-
tages to proceed in unprotected activities are lesser than for richer counties, and (2) richer
counties are also assumed to create more parks for ornamental aims. The quadratic term
incsqj is thus assumed to be negative, i.e., the income effect on the creation of parks is
U-inversed.
The variables popj, urbj and rurj are the average annual population growth, urban
density (per km2) and rural density (per km2) respectively between 2000-2010. These
variables are proxies for labor supply, and demand of lands and are expected to have a
negative effect on pj.
Curitiba is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for the capital of Parana´ namely
Curitiba and 0 otherwise to control for the strong differences of this county compared to
the others. Indeed, Curitiba strongly desires to be a green city20,21.
We also introduce micro-region dummies (µr), which represent legally defined adminis-
trative areas consisting of groups of municipalities bordering urban areas. These dummies
enable us to check for unobserved fixed effects shared by neighboring counties. In the state
of Parana´, 39 micro-regions are censused for 399 counties.
Data concerning CUs (pj, p
init
j and FEDj) are taken from the ICMS-E’s official web-
site. All other variables come from the IPEA database (see Table 2 page 30 in the
Appendix for more information on descriptive statistics)22.
20Note that the 2011 UN-Habitat report quoted Jaime Lemer the mayor of Curitiba: “The city is not
the problem, it is the solution. And it is a solution for the problem of climate change.” (United Nations,
2011)
21Note that in a standard cross section, it would be akin to dropping the observation. However, it
is different in a SAR model, since the municipality behavior influences the other decision through the
spatially lagged endogenous variable.
22Monetary variables are taken in constant values (2000R$).
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4.2. Estimator
The estimation of parameters from the spatial autoregressive Tobit model represents
a computational challenge and cannot be done via analytical methods. Indeed, it is
impossible to use maximum likelihood due to multiple integrals in the likelihood function.
Therefore, the econometrician must turn to simulation methods, such as EM algorithm
or Bayesian estimation. We choose to rely here on the bayesian approach developed by
LeSage (1999), LeSage (2000), LeSage and Pace (2009) and applied by Autant-Bernard
and LeSage (2011), due to its computational simplicity and the possibility to easily account
for heteroscedasticity in the error terms in this framework23.
In this approach, the model parameters are estimated via MCMC (Monte Carlo
Markov Chain) procedure, with a chosen number of n draws, such as estimator con-
vergence is achieved. The posterior mean and standard deviation of parameters estimated
at each draw will then be used as parameter values in the displayed results. Furthermore,
the unobserved negative profits associated with the censored 0 observations are consid-
ered as parameters to estimate. The procedure uses the Geweke m-steps Gibbs sampler
to produce draws from a multivariate truncated normal distribution in order to generate
the unobserved negative profits associated with the censored 0 observations24,25.
4.3. Interpretation of the coefficients estimated
Coefficients from a SAR model cannot be interpreted directly. Indeed there is an
implicit form behind the model presented in Equation 6. It can be rewritten as:
P ∗ − ρWP ∗ = βX +  (8)
23Our choice is similar to the one adopted by Albers et al. (2008) when studying the interactions
between private and public park creation in the United States.
24The m-steps correspond to the number of draws used to generate the unobserved negative profits,
realized at each n draw.
25In addition, to produce estimates that will be robust in the presence of non-constant variance of
disturbances (heteroscedasticity) and outliers, it is assumed that, in the development of the Gibbs sam-
pler, the hyperparameter r, that determines the extent to which the disturbances take on a leptokurtic
character, is stated at 4, as suggested by LeSage (1999).
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P ∗(IN − ρW ) = βX +  (9)
P ∗ = (IN − ρW )−1βX + (IN − ρW )−1 (10)
As we can see from Equation 10, ∂p
∗
∂x′ 6= β, but ∂p
∗
∂x′ = (IN − ρW )−1β. This occurs
because of the spillovers generated by the decisions of neighboring counties. To interpret
the coefficients of a spatial model, the researcher has to calculate the direct impact of
a variable, its indirect impact and the total impact (equal to the direct impact plus the
indirect impact). Indeed, a change on an explanatory variable in a particular region will
affect the p∗ value of this region (direct impact), but also the other regions because of
the spatial spillovers (indirect impact). Computation details of these impacts are clearly
described in (LeSage and Pace, 2009, (p.33-39)).
Finally, note that estimated coefficients from the Tobit model are not the marginal
effects of each explanatory variable on the observed dependent variable26. Therefore we
can interpret the signs of the direct and indirect effects but not their magnitudes.
5. Results
5.1. Neighboring effects and created CUs
We estimated the influence of neighbors’ decisions as well as several economic indica-
tors on a municipality’s propensity to create parks. The Municipal Conservation Factor,
implemented by the state of Parana´ to redistribute the ICMS-E, is used as dependent
variable. As explained in Section 2.2, the MCF is derived from the ratio of CUs on to-
tal municipal area weighted by a quality factor. In all regressions, the contiguity spatial
weight matrix is used to represent the prior strength between two counties. Our results
come from the estimation of a Baysesian spatial Tobit model using one step in the Gibbs
sampler and 1,000 draws in the MCMC procedure27. Our main results are presented
26Basically, the coefficient is the marginal effect on the latent dependent variable. See the pioneering
article of McDonald and Moffitt (1980) and Wooldridge (2001, pp 521–524) for more details.
27With 10% of the draws used as burn-in.
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in Table 4, where the first column presents the value of the coefficients (β), the second
column the value of the direct impact of the explanatory variable, the third column the
indirect impact and the fourth the total impact.
[insert Table 4 here]
Negative spatial interactions between counties are found (ρ < 0) suggesting that a
county is more inclined to create municipal CUs if their neighboring counties decrease the
number of their CUs. It seems more profitable for a county to convert its natural land for
agricultural or industrial activities if their neighboring counties have opted to create CUs
and be awarded by the ICMS-E. Moreover this result could explain the stable trend in
the creation of municipal CUs in the last decade after a strong upward trend in the early
years of the implementation of the ICMS-E, as described in Section 2.3.
Concerning the other economic factors assumed to have an effect on the land allocation
rule-decision of a county (through their effects on the differential profit between land
use options), the population variables have the expected negative coefficient but are not
significant.
Moreover, the structure of a county’s economy is found to be important in explaining
its propensity to create municipal CUs. In fact, the higher the share of agriculture in
a municipality is, the lower the propensity to create municipal CUs. This result reveals
the role of economic activities in the propensity to create CUs. Counties that are more
developed in terms of agricultural activities can be more encouraged to develop their
activities to earn money from the ICMS, which awards counties on the basis of their value
added created.
Besides, Table 5 provides the estimated direct, indirect and total effects of each ex-
planatory variable. We observe an indirect effect of lower magnitude and of the opposite
sign compared to the direct effect, which is due to the substitutable nature of conserva-
tion decisions. For instance, we observe a positive indirect effect of the agricultural GDP,
which mean that an increase in the agricultural ratio in a given region will increase the
creation of parks in neighboring regions.
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5.2. Robustness checks
5.2.1. Taking only account of the size of protected areas
As our first robustness check, we use a different measure of the environmental perfor-
mance of a county. We choose to use only an extensive measure of protection as dependent
variable: the Biodiversity Conservation Coefficient (see Section 2.2). The BCC is the ra-
tio of protected areas on total land. This allows us to check the robustness of our first
result (the substitutability in conservation decisions) and to see if the driving forces tested
influence the way a county chooses to improve its of land protection, i.e., in an intensive
or extensive manner. Table 5 presents results for the BCC as dependent variable.
[insert table 5 here]
Negative spatial interactions between counties are also found, thus confirming the
negative effects of the creation of CUs by neighboring counties on a coounty’s propensity
to create CUs.
Concerning other economic factors, the negative effect of agricultural activities is still
found, suggesting that counties whose economies are based more on agriculture are less
prone to increase their level of CUs. Interestingly, the density of urban population and the
industrial GDP are now factors which threaten protection. It is worthy to note that these
factors have a negative effect on the extensive component of protection (the BCC), but
not when we take into account the intensity of the protection (the MCF). This suggests
that urban areas with high population density and industrial based economy counties care
as much about the environment as others, but choose to protect their land in an intensive
rather than in an extensive manner.
5.2.2. Checking the consistency of the estimator
Since the Bayesian spatial Tobit is a new estimator and few researchers have used
it, we provide several robustness tests on the estimator itself. Indeed, to our knowledge,
it has been proposed in the article of LeSage (2000) and the manuals of LeSage (1999)
and LeSage and Pace (2009), but, to the best of our knowledge, has only been applied
in Autant-Bernard and LeSage (2011). The main issue concerns the consistency of the
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estimator. We assess it by alternatively and simultaneously increasing the number of m-
steps in the Gibbs sampler and the number of n-draws in the MCMC procedure. The
basic assumption is that if the inferences are identical, the estimator can be assumed to
be consistent.
The first robustness check on the number of steps in the Gibbs sampler process aims at
testing the accuracy of the computed vector of parameters which replaces the unobserved
latent utility (here for p∗j,t < 0) (LeSage and Pace, 2009, p.287).
The second test consists in increasing the number of draws and comparing the infer-
ences based on a smaller set of draws (here n=1,000) to those resulting from a larger set
of draws (here n=10,000) in order to evaluate the stability in the parameter values found.
Table 6 provides results with the MCF coefficients as the dependent variable for re-
spectively 1, 10 and 20 steps of the Gibbs sampler process, with 1,000 and 10,000 draws.
The spatial interactions are still found to be negative and significant as are the initial
municipal conservation factor and the agricultural ratio. Therefore, we do not conclude
that the estimator is inconsistent.
[insert table 6 here]
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess the efficiency of the ICMS-E by testing the presence
of strategic interactions between Brazilian counties in the state of Parana´. It is a fiscal
transfer from the state to municipalities on the basis of the performance of each county
in the creation and management of CUs.
This fiscal scheme is important since it is a form of payment for environmental services
which can be implemented without any external source of financing and at very low trans-
action costs. However, since the system is decentralized, its efficiency could be threatened
by the presence of interactions between municipalities when they decide to set aside their
lands for protection.
Therefore, this study tries to investigate whether the behavior of neighboring counties,
in terms of created municipal CUs, had an effect on a county’s propensity to create mu-
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nicipal CUs between 2000 and 2010 in the state of Parana´. The results do not highlight
a race to the bottom between counties which would have finally questioned the efficiency
of the ICMS-E. However, we do observe strategic substitutability between conservation
decisions. This means that the utility gained from the creation of a park decreased (in-
creased) if the neighbor created more (less) protected areas. This seems to have led the
mechanism to reach an equilibrium in the last decade.
In a way, the mechanism seems to be efficient, because our results suggest that the
behavior of municipalities is driven by an optimization process and that take their neigh-
bors’ decisions into account when making their own decisions. However, there is no reason
for the shared pool of money to lead to the optimal level of land set aside for protection.
Moreover, it seems that municipalities do not act as good samaritans providing public
goods but are really subject to a financial calculations. Thus, the design of the ICMS-E,
via the definition of the quality weighting factor, seems crucial.
To conclude, the ICMS-E has had great success and has increased the number of CUs
in Parana´. This experience should be viewed as a new and interesting tool to finance
local public good without the need for external funding. However, policy makers should
be aware of the potential negative spatial interactions which can occur, since these could
be an obstacle to conservation objectives such as the creation of biodiversity corridor.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Geographical location of the state of Parana´ in Brazil
Figure 1: Parana´ in Brazil
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica
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7.2. Calculation of the ICMS-E: the conservation factor
Table 1: Conservation factor FCn for different management categories n of protected areas in Parana´
Management category Federal State Municipal
Ecological research station 0.8 0.8 1
Biological reserve 0.8 0.8 1
Parks 0.7 0.7 0.9
Private natural heritage reserve (RPPN) 0.68 0.68 .
Area of relevant ecological interest 0.66 0.66 0.66
Forest 0.64 0.64 0.64
Indigenous area 0.45 . .
Buffer zones (Faxinais) . 0.45 .
Environmental protection area 0.08 0.08 0.08
Special, local areas of tourist interest 0.08 0.08 0.08
Source: Adapted from (Loureiro et al., 2008, p.73). A point (.)
mentions that there is none CU of this nature. For instance,
there is none municipal or state indigenous area.
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7.3. Descriptive statistics
Figure 2: Evolution of the number of counties in the ICMS-E'
&
$
%
Number of
counties: 399
ICMS-E in 2000:
174
ICMS-E in 2010:
170
Not in ICMS-E in
2010: 4
Not in ICMS-E in
2000: 225
ICMS-E in 2010:
22
not ICMS-E in
2010: 203
Note: Evolutions between 2000 and 2010 of the number of counties concerning by the
ICMS-E, whatever the CUs.
Source: drafted by the authors
Figure 3: Evolution of the number of counties in the ICMS-E for municipal CUs'
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%
Number of
counties: 399
ICMS-E in 2000:
57
ICMS-E in 2010:
53
Not in ICMS-E in
2010: 4
Not in ICMS-E in
2000: 342
ICMS-E in 2010:
13
not ICMS-E in
2010: 329
Note: Evolutions between 2000 and 2010 of the number of counties concerning by the
ICMS-E for the creation of municipal CUs.
Source: drafted by the authors
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
CUs ratio (2010) 0.0034 (0.0238) 0 0.2175 399
Coefficient quality (2010) 0.0018 (0.009) 0 0.1272 399
CUs ratio (2000) 0.0018 (0.0156) 0 0.1993 399
Coefficient quality (2000) 0.0013 (0.0093) 0 0.1695 399
CUs ratio (Federal, State) 2010 0.0444 (0.1322) 0 0.9876 399
Coefficient quality (Federal, State) 2010 0.0135 (0.0386) 0 0.3254 399
Agricultural GDP/GDP 0.3051 (0.1484) 0.0004 0.6235 399
Industrial GDP/GDP 0.1439 (0.1148) 0.0288 0.8336 399
GDP 5.647 3.305 (2.278) 42.817 399
GDP squared 42.786 (105.342) 5.189 1833.269 399
Population growth 2.2483 (11.7301) -38.4769 73.3038 399
Urban population density 51.1113 (233.5605) 0.8544 3918.803 399
Rural population density 9.4345 (10.9149) 0 192.9066 399
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ICMS-E website http://www.
icmsecologico.org.br/ and the IPEA website http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/. Mon-
etary variables are taken in constant values (2000R$).
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7.4. Creation of CUs over time
Figure 4: Evolution of the creation of all CUs in Parana´ between 1991 and 2010
Note: Evolution of the areas (in hectare) of all conservation units (federal, state and
municipal) between 2000 and 2010.
Source: Authors’ calculation from May et al. (2002) and Grieg-Gran (2000), and
authors’ collected data.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Municipal CU 1,171.67 3,665.87 1.4 22,76
Ratio of Municipal CU on total area 0.02 0.06 0 0.22
N 66
Federal and state CU 10,030.03 24,534.67 1.72 213,265.20
Ratio of Federal and state CU on total area 0.11 0.19 0 0.99
N 165
Notes : Conservation Units (CU) are measured in hectares, for the year 2010.
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8. Tables
Table 4: Spatial interactions and MCF
Dependent variable : MCF 2010
n=1000, m=1
Variable Coefficient Direct Indirect Total
ρ -0.007961**
(0.015)
MCF2000 2.147355*** 2.159819*** -0.017943** 2.141876***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000)
FED2010 0.046348 0.04671 -0.000395 0.046315
(0.408) (0.417) (0.502) (0.417)
pop -0.000087 -0.000099 0.000001 -0.000098
(0.732) (0.718) (0.724) (0.718)
agr -0.120156*** -0.121699*** 0.001038* -0.120661***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000)
ind -0.045715 -0.046228 0.0004 -0.045827
(0.130) (0.129) (0.273) (0.129)
inc 0.007792 0.007482 -0.000067 0.007415
(0.763) (0.773) (0.790) (0.773)
incsq -0.002343 -0.00224 0.00002 -0.00222
(0.699) (0.714) (0.744) (0.714)
rur -0.000506 -0.000507 0.000004 -0.000503
(0.193) (0.212) (0.317) (0.212)
urb -0.000005 -0.000005 -0.000000 -0.000005
(0.738) (0.725) (0.739) (0.725)
Curitiba -0.22267*** -0.223891*** 0.001851* -0.22204***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.080) (0.004)
intercept -0.033999
(0.277)
µr yes
Notes: ***=significant at the 1 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent
level, *=significant at the 10 percent level. p-values associated to the reported
coefficients are in parentheses. n correspond to the number of draws and m to
the number of steps in the gibbs sampler.33
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Table 5: Spatial interactions and BCC
Dependent variable : BCC in 2010
n=1000, m=1
Variable Coefficient Direct Indirect Total
ρ -0.015591**
(0.049)
ratiom2000 2.496689*** 2.50393*** -0.042608* 2.461322***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000)
ratioFED2010 0.002393 0.001981 -0.000046 0.001935
(0.917) (0.930) (0.920) (0.931)
pop -0.000238 -0.000225 0.000004 -0.000221
(0.424) (0.448) (0.532) (0.447)
agr -0.158445*** -0.157292*** 0.002696* -0.154596***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000)
ind -0.06142** -0.059479** 0.001014 -0.058464**
(0.039) (0.049) (0.204) (0.049)
inc -0.00736 -0.009311 0.000168 -0.009144
(0.781) (0.730) (0.743) (0.731)
incsq 0.002291 0.002695 -0.00005 0.002646
(0.720) (0.676) (0.686) (0.677)
rur -0.000265 -0.000301 0.000004 -0.000296
(0.448) (0.417) (0.510) (0.417)
urb -0.00015*** -0.00015*** 0.000003* -0.000148***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000)
Curitiba 0.269058*** 0.269791*** -0.004644* 0.265147***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000)
intercept 0.033778
(0.310)
µr yes
Notes: ***=significant at the 1 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent
level, *=significant at the 10 percent level. p-values associated to the reported
coefficients are in parentheses. n correspond to the number of draws and m to
the number of steps in the gibbs sampler.
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Table 6: Consistency tests
Dependent variable : MCF 2010
m= 1 10 20
n= 1000 10000 1000 10000 1000 10000
Variable
ρ -0.007961** -0.005395** -0.0093** -0.00786** -0.009105*** -0.00481*
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.029) (0.001) (0.075)
MCF2000 2.147355*** 2.083261*** 2.0062*** 2.03212*** 2.035416*** 2.095744***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FED2010 0.046348 0.048372 0.0476 0.049377 0.040812 0.042334
(0.408) (0.361) (0.299) (0.332) (0.408) (0.418)
pop -0.000087 -0.000195 -0.000000 -0.000111 -0.000000 -0.000122
(0.732) (0.435) (0.827) (0.652) (0.999) (0.623)
agr -0.120156*** -0.120498*** -0.0978*** -0.110865*** -0.103823*** -0.112345***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ind -0.045715 -0.047154 -0.0404 -0.044297 -0.047554* -0.043165
(0.130) (0.101) (0.106) (0.106) (0.068) (0.127)
inc 0.007792 0.009978 0.0067 0.009938 0.012694 0.009026
(0.763) (0.711) (0.776) (0.697) (0.593) (0.723)
incsq -0.002343 -0.00256 -0.0023 -0.002748 -0.003612 -0.002489
(0.699) (0.681) (0.675) (0.646) (0.517) (0.680)
rur -0.000506 -0.00033 -0.0005 -0.000368 -0.000469 -0.000372
(0.193) (0.310) (0.210) (0.279) (0.174) (0.305)
urb -0.000005 -0.000005 -0.000000 -0.000005 -0.000006 -0.000005
(0.738) (0.697) (0.686) (0.714) (0.626) (0.709)
Curitiba -0.22267*** -0.208601*** -0.2005*** -0.20258*** -0.200199*** -0.211293***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
intercept -0.033999 -0.028195 -0.0258 -0.036568 -0.029702 -0.028634
(0.277) (0.424) (0.373) (0.266) (0.360) (0.395)
µr yes
Notes: ***=significant at the 1 percent level, **=significant at the 5 percent level, *=significant at
the 10 percent level. p-values associated to the reported coefficients are in parentheses. n correspond
to the number of draws and m to the number of steps in the gibbs sampler.
35
